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Letter From the editors
Dear Readers,

It has officially been a full year in COVID-19
induced quarantine. The start of the new millennia
saw the rise of a world-dominating pandemic that has
claimed 2.65 million lives globally as of writing this
letter. In the United States, we saw the Black Lives
Matter movement gain greater attention after the
tragic death of George Floyd, forcing Americans to
take a good look at ourselves and the history of
systemic racial oppression that continues to pervade
institutions like the police. Wildfires have raged
across the globe, unseating wildlife and families while
extreme cold and flooding virtually shut down the
state of Texas just this year.
During this time, President Trump became the
first president to be impeached twice. His supporters
were then responsible for inciting an insurgency at
the U.S. capitol following the 2020 Election. Despite
this horrifying event, Kamala Harris became the first
woman of color to accept the role of Vice President
while President Biden has begun the process of
building the most diverse administration in U.S.
history.
So after the events of the past year, what have we
learned as a country, as a world?
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In this issue you will see Cooper Price analyze the
effects of depoliticization on party politics in Japan.
Ethan Stern-Ellis discusses the lack of comprehensive
U.S. climate policy, while Anneke Taylor looks at the
dangerous consequences of incorporating low-yield
nuclear weapons into military arsenals. For my own
paper (Lily Hoak) I present interviews with women at
many levels of U.S. foreign policy and national
security to better understand the experiences and
significance of gender in their fields.
As we enter an unprecedented era of U.S.
governance, both at home and abroad, we hope these
papers offer greater insight to the world around you
and encourage broader edification for students and
scholars alike. Under new leadership, and in a time
where we are moving towards a post-pandemic life,
there is much to be thankful for and many reasons to
hope. Following so many months of trauma, we have
learned and been reminded of the resiliency of the
human race and the human spirit.

Sincerely,
Lily Hoak & Morgan MacFarlane

THE COMMONS
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Pop rocks and Persistence
Finding the Women in U.S. Foreign Policy
and National Security
LILY HOAK

One hundred years after the ratification of the 19th Amendment, women
in the United States continue to face societal and institutionalized biases that
can undermine the success of women everywhere. This is especially true when
it comes to leadership in the U.S. government. While the number of women
serving in state and federal legislatures has increased, the number of women
leaders in the foreign policy and national security enterprise continues to be
lacking. As I progressed in my International Relations degree, I realized that I
was most frequently learning about men, from men. I then asked: where are
the women in U.S. foreign policy and national security (FP/NS)? Over the last
three months, I have interviewed fifteen women from various FP/NS
backgrounds and degrees of experience to understand their time in the field
and how their identities as women have impacted their work. The decades-old
networks of aging, white men who have held, and continue to hold, the
majority of positions across the foreign policy establishment have created a
culture where women must work harder than their male counterparts work in
order to advance. In addition, almost all of these women reported casual
sexism and discrimination in the workplace. While increasing support from
male and female career service members and mentors has helped increase the
number of women in FP/NS, the fraternal cultures of the FP/NS institutions
have engendered and enabled underrepresentation of women in the field.
Such representation is necessary so that decision-makers in FP/NS are more
informed and are better representative of the country that they serve.

Essays

METHOD

In order to better understand the field of and the fraternal cultures within
FP/NS in the United States, I interviewed fifteen women from across various
agencies and institutions. In these interviews, I asked a set of questions that
focused on their backgrounds, careers, and personal thoughts and experiences
as women in FP/NS. I also asked for their thoughts on the future of women in
FP/NS and advice for young women entering the field. In analyzing their
answers, I identified several themes that were consistent across all of the
interviews. The results will be explained below. The women were selected in
no particular order, as I was put in contact with some of the interviewees
through the others with whom I had spoken. Their names have been replaced
with pseudonyms to ensure their anonymity. Interviews have been edited for
clarity.
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DIVERSE VOICES MATTER

Agencies that are made up of entirely or almost all male staff
members are not representative of the populations that they serve and protect.
This is often the case all around the world where governments are making
policy choices. One of the most shining examples of this is in peace
negotiations. One study that examined “eighty-two peace agreements in fortytwo armed conflicts between 1989 and 2011 concluded that peace agreements
with women are associated with ‘durable peace’” and that agreements “signed
by women show a higher number of provisions aimed at political reform and
implementation.”¹ Yet, women are still being left out when negotiations are
conferred. Many women also believe that they bring their own unique skills to
diplomacy and foreign policy. Denmark’s Ambassador to the United States
Lone Dencker Wisborg has said that “men are focused on winning and women
are focused on getting things done.”² Former Hungarian Ambassador to the
U.S. Reka Szermerkenyi has stated that “women have a more natural talent for
approaching conflict compared to men, but a combination of men and women
is hugely important, because in many cases, what is missing is an ability to
smooth things together.”³ Including people of diverse backgrounds means
including diverse perspectives on issues and widening the window of
possibility for progress in any given field.
EXPERIENCES: THEN

The experiences of women in the field of FP/NS since the early 1970’s
paint an illuminating picture for women’s place in the establishment. One
woman, Laura, is a former Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission and has
worked in the field for over thirty years. Her career highlights the changes over
time. When she started, women could not get the language training that they
needed and were essentially excluded from posts in the Middle East and most
of Asia. She says that what women were told repeatedly that “[they] couldn’t,
[they] couldn’t, [they] couldn’t.”⁴ One of her early bosses, who she referred to
as the “jerk of all jerks”, was unhappy that he had been assigned a woman.
When she arrived at the post, he escorted her to her new office, which turned
out to include a fridge, coffee pot, and a hot plate. He had literally put her in
the kitchen. He then proceeded to exclude her from all meetings and assign
her no work. Luckily, the other men in the office tried to include her, and she
sought out work on her own. Eventually, the Ambassador heard her story after
she requested a transfer and the ‘jerk’ was asked to retire.
Later on in her career and at a new post, Laura continued to face
workplace discrimination and harassment. She detailed one experience in
¹
²

Sloan Susan. A Seat at the Table: Women, Diplomacy,
and Lessons for the World (New Degree Press, 2020), 63
Ibid., 276
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which she was sexually harassed while wearing a Diane von Furstenberg wrap
dress (she made a note of telling me this detail). A senior official stopped to
chat with her and then, as an apparent joke, pulled on the tie of her dress to
undo it. Laura told herself to just let it go but informed her boss of the incident.
Her boss asked her if she wanted him to say anything and she said that she
would think of an appropriate response later. She said that, some time after
the incident had occurred, the offender was in her section and that she had
some Pop Rocks. She asked if he had ever had them and when he said no, she
offered him some. She explained that you were supposed to eat the entire pack
at once, in an apparent effort to embarrass him. Soon, Pop Rocks were fizzing
out of his nose. While this was certainly an unconventional response, it was
one way that this woman found to handle an offensive and ridiculous act from
her work colleague. Another story she relayed to me was not specifically about
her, but rather about former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Laura
detailed an encounter between Albright and former Ambassador Richard
Holbrooke at a panel. Holbrooke reportedly “mansplained” to Albright the
entire time, despite the fact that she was more senior than he was and had held
a cabinet position.
Another woman I spoke with, Katherine, has a background in
national security. She was raised by female professors and, after completing
her undergraduate degree, worked for a national security scholar, which
sparked her interest in defense policy. After graduate school, she worked
under a top military advisor for six years. During that time, like most of the
people I interviewed, she was one of the only women at her place of
employment. She was also the only civilian staff member. This meant that she
was not in “competition” with the military officers for possible promotions.
She said that “what we were doing mattered too much” to have her gender
impact their work. While she did not identify specific incidents of
discrimination, she did cite an experience in which sexist assumptions were
made of her. She stated that, while she was an official representative, one man
assumed that she was a secretary at a meeting. This is something that multiple
women have attested to have happened to them. With this, she stated there
was “general creepy, predatory behavior.” This sort of behavior, in comparison
to something like the Pop Rocks incident, indicates the broader, cultural
problems that breed in male-dominated institutions. However, Katherine said
the institution itself was looking out for her more broadly and that she “joined
at the crest of diversifying the field.”⁵ She said that she had help from her male
colleagues, who mitigated the impact of gender-based discrimination from
select individuals. With this, she said that her “experience is markedly
different because, for [her], being a woman has been a marginal advantage”
due to the various mentors and programs she was able to have and access
5
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because of her gender.⁶ As she rose in the ranks and took on supervisory
positions, she knew that people would not make assumptions or asperse her
based on or because of her gender. She said her experience in these leadership
positions, especially one that involved her working under a top military
advisor, taught her how to unflinchingly deal with incidents of bias and to
develop a thick skin. Despite her comparatively positive experience, she
acknowledged that most of her young female friends have had poorer
experiences in FP/NS.
One more woman that I interviewed, Juliet, began her career before
2000. Juliet said that “things she had to contend with are no longer acceptable
today.” Throughout her education in FP/NS, there were hardly any female role
models or professors. Her field of expertise, Russia/USSR, was largely
dominated by men, despite the fact that the USSR had a larger contingent of
women. The nuclear weapons and arms control sectors were predominantly
male, filled with “generations of men who think that any hard power or
military or armed services/weapons are always male.” Juliet said that, because
of this assumption, “many people felt that women would feel uncomfortable
negotiating with force rather than diplomacy.”⁷
EXPERIENCES: NOW

Many of the women that I spoke with who entered the field more
recently have seen a lot of growth and increased diversity. While there have
been more women at the forefront of US foreign policy—like Madeleine
Albright, Condoleezza Rice, and Hillary Clinton—there has been a less visible
but no less important increase in the lower ranks. Still, many also face similar
discrimination as the women did before them.
Jane has worked in several sub-sects of government, including the
Marine Corps. When she joined the military, there were mostly male senior
officers and no female mentors in the Marines. With this, there were structural
barriers in place, like women being barred from combat (until 2015). These
barriers prevented advancement for many female service members. In
response to this, women found loopholes, like the Lioness and Female
Engagement Teams (FETs) which allowed them to go into combat zones for a
maximum of forty-four days. She also described, like other military members
I spoke with, the sexual harassment issues and inappropriate actions of senior
officers. When she was given a rare opportunity to head into a combat zone,
the men stationed there assumed that she was going to be male. A senior
officer, apparently shocked, “said no straight out” to her being assigned to this
position (he was eventually promoted). She said that, at first, the military is an
equalizer because everyone enters at the same level, but that the balance of
6
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power soon becomes increasingly unequal because advancement to higherrank positions is predicated on past lengthy, usually lifelong military
experience. These positions often self-select for men not only because of sheer
military experience that is expected, but also because these positions allow for
little time outside of work to attend to domestic duties or childcare obligations.
Women who achieve these positions are often either childless, married to
other officers of similar ranks, or are in relationships in which there is more
shared responsibility. When Jane transitioned to work as a civilian in the
Pentagon, her “male coworkers assumed that I didn’t know anything about the
military.” Working in this environment became “emotionally exhausting” and
that the hyper-masculine culture has made her regret “not sticking up for
women all of the time.”⁸
Claire also served in the U.S. Armed Forces. She has dealt with sexism
and harassment in the military since she joined ROTC in high school. During
her initial training in the military, a superior officer sexually harassed her. To
avoid being harassed again, she attempted to complete part of her training
early. She said that she did “the right thing by not reporting.”⁹ Claire also has
had to deal with microaggressions at work, especially in her current position
at an agency in which she is one of only a few Black employees. She states that
there is a sense of people wondering, “why does this Black girl have this job?”
She stated that there are also male subordinates who regularly contradict
female superiors, “even when [they] would be dead wrong, like completely
wrong.” Claire cited an incident of this behavior that occurred during a jointdepartment meeting with a senior military officer. A woman tried to tell a
colonel that her office needed something different than what was in the plan
and that he “essentially told her to ‘stay in her lane.’” When the man called on
another male officer, who had the same suggestion as the woman did, the
colonel took his point. Claire remarked that “basically, what she said wasn’t
valid until a white man said it.” Claire pointed out that there is no formal
mechanism or process in place to report these micro-aggressions. Claire also
shared that a male co-worker had told her that he had noticed that women
would bond in the hallways “even if they didn’t know each other” and would
give one another “looks” in response to behavior by “some straight up
assholes.” She said that he thought that there was a “unwritten rule of
friendship between the women.” Like Jane, she was thankful for her time in
the service, but “was sick of it” towards the end. When she worked with female
engagement teams, her boss asked, “What about home life?” during a briefing.
Claire responded by saying. “Well, I’m single. . . and I don’t have a husband”
and that this officer basically sounded like an Afghan man. When she was
leaving, he “knew he had put his foot in it” and requested that she not tell
anyone about their conversation.
8
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Another Army officer, Morgan, described similar situations that happened in
the late 90s and early 2000s. She said when she was in the lower ranks, she
always had to be “on the lookout” for sexual predators. Although this was less
necessary when she was older, she would still occasionally find herself in
potentially dangerous situations with male colleagues.¹⁰ Prior to her active
duty, she attended West Point several years after women were first allowed
entry into the Academy. She said that a friend, who was in West Point’s first
class, had to deal with far more blatant aggression and threats to her physical
safety than she had to. Morgan said that this demonstrated how having women
there before you can make a difference in how accommodating a maledominated environment can be for women. In her chosen specialty, there were
institutional biases and barriers that perpetuated women’s exclusion from
combat. Women were not allowed to be certified in certain modes of transport,
purely because these modes of transport had a weapon attached to them. While
senior personnel were well aware of the issue, they were more inclined to see
why “certain races were drawn towards certain sections that had less room for
advancement, which made it feel like the race issue overshadowed the gender
one” when, really, both issues were of great concern. While working for one
senior office, she said that the officials “had a chip on their shoulder about
gender questions.” In meetings, she described how, as a woman, “[she] sat back
and listened” in order to have her voice heard. She also “had to be more active
than [her] male colleagues” because she was never going to be called on or
asked a question.¹¹
Elle also worked in the defense sector, but was not a member of the
military. After receiving a fellowship, she chose to start work in an especially
male-dominated part of the Department of Defense, despite being female and
significantly younger than a majority of the military staff employed there. Elle
said that being younger in this position “had a bigger impact” on her job than
being a woman. However, Elle admitted that she still had to face “additional
discrimination.”¹² She stated that her appearance as a blonde woman who did
not wear the unofficial black or navy suit that most women wore made her
stand out even more. However, Elle said that, when she spoke, her colleagues
understood her and that this deterred greater bias against her.
There was also “low-grade sexual harassment and plenty of inappropriate
comments,” including men making advances at her at work. She picked her
battles, like Laura did, because if she “got upset all the time, it would wear [her]
down.” Around this time, Elle was also working with international networks.
She said that she faced more gender concerns when abroad. Once, while
traveling in Eastern Europe with a young Black Army officer, she said that they
10
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drew a lot of stares, which was somewhat off-putting. After a military site tour,
her coworker said he was scared that others were going to try to grab her hair
and “drag [her] out behind the building.”¹³ While Elle was traveling in the
Middle East, she said that her blonde hair garnered a lot of attention and
attracted a large crowd of young men, who surrounded her and took pictures.
These stories show the heightened significance of physical safety for women in
the field. Later in her career, after transitioning back to public service, she
noticed that many of her friends who had been with her during her initial
fellowship had left government service. She said that her female colleagues’
withdrawal from government service can likely be attributed to an issue that I
had not considered at the outset of this project: the struggle to balance work
and home life as a woman. Several mothers who I spoke with discussed how
difficult it was to start and raise a family with the demands and constraints of
their time-consuming, taxing careers. Elle explained that “maternity leave”
(she requested that air quotes be used here) is practically non-existent. Elle
said that, when she was pregnant with her twins, she had to save enough sick
and vacation time to take care of her newborns: she, therefore, could not take
any time off during her pregnancy. This is the way most women get enough
time off to stay home after having children. When her twins were born several
weeks early, she realized that she needed more time off than she had initially
anticipated. Elle described being in a panic, both over her babies’ welfare and
over her job security, while on the phone with a human resources
representative while still in her hospital room. The unwillingness of this field to
create more flexible approaches for maternity and paternity leave places
unnecessary restraints on women’s careers.
Leslie, like Morgan and Katherine, has worked in the field since the
1990s, but has yet to work directly for a female boss. The majority-male, mostly
male-run networks meant that advancement within the workplace was
predicated on one’s ability to engage with one’s male superiors. Leslie said that
she developed habits to make herself more comfortable in and compatible with
that environment. She said that a graduate school professor once told her to
read the sports section every day so she would have something to discuss with
her male colleagues at work. She also described having to verbally “elbow her
way in” by interrupting, physically taking up space, and being more aggressive
and assertive. When she received a new job as a political appointee, her boss
“had to gently counsel” her to not interrupt people, which Leslie found “ironic.”
She said that one department in her office had a more blatantly hostile culture
due to its military components. Leslie said that more people had a chip on their
shoulder (an oft-used phrase by most of the women I interviewed) about
women working there. One anecdote that she shared was about how a group of

¹² Phone Interview with the Author, 10 August 2020
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women working there were called the “click clack girls” because of the sound
that their heels made on the marble floor.¹⁴ She stated that men would make
lewd comments at work, which could be construed as being done to
intentionally make the women uncomfortable and what Leslie said was a
demonstration of the “general bro-iness” of the workplace. Similar to the
situation that Claire described, women’s contributions during meetings would
often go ignored until a male coworker would repeat them later.
Unlike the other women interviewed, Bridget completed her
undergraduate and law degrees after she had had children. So, by the time she
began her public service career, her children were much older. She said that,
throughout her career, that she has worked with a lot of women leaders. While
her current sector is unequal in terms of gender representation, she said that
“it’s not horrifying.” She said that this may be true of the whole department,
stating that an office that she wouldn’t name has “a lady problem with no
women in management.” Her limited engagement with another agency that
sends male-dominated delegations to her office has resulted in a running joke—
they “forgot to bring their women.”¹⁵ Her focus on foreign assistance and aid
has resulted in her not having to deal with “old boys club” issues, but has seen
other women in different sub-sects having to navigate problematic work
environments.
While Nancy has largely worked in academia, she has some work
experience in Congress and the White House. When I asked if she felt that there
was gender-based discrimination, she responded “Yes, certainly.” She said that
there is a more subtle, structural form of bias, which women like Katherine and
Morgan, who described bias as being more individual-based, did not observe.
Nancy said that gender prejudice is especially pervasive in her field, a field
which has been focusing on typically masculine topics for the last seventy years.
She said that, for women who “don’t want to engage in the cultural repartee”,
work can be a “struggle.” Nancy’s subfield is steeped in language and actions
surrounding power and domination, with “lots of military in the mix.”¹⁶ Nancy
argued that the way policy is made and viewed in her field prioritizes the
concept of “a single person making a decision, which is a masculine notion.”
When asked if conditions have improved over the last thirty years, she said
there “has been no change at all.”¹⁷ At a government post, she volunteered to
do everything in the office. When people saw that she could do the work, they
then began to rely on her. When it became known that she had a controversial
policy opinion in her area of expertise, younger men would engage with her, but
older men would dismiss her outright. She had to convince them to have a
conversation with her. Sometimes, they responded by loudly throwing jargon
14
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in her face, and she would respond in kind. When she stood her ground, they
would speak with her, but would also start to hit on her. When they failed to
overpower her intellectually, they felt a need to sexualize her instead. More
broadly, the administration she worked in would try to cover up this behavior.
She recalled senior women discussing how “creepy” a male coworker who
groped women was, but not taking action to punish him or prevent his
behavior. When incidents did get reported, higher-ups would try to sweep them
under the rug. Nancy’s experience highlights the lack of cultural progress
within the field and how far there is to go.
After working an unpaid internship for a government think-tank, Julia
worked for a defense sector as an executive assistant for a director. Julia
described her boss, a retired Marine, as a “dysfunctional and toxic manager”
and that the other military personnel there were also difficult to work with.¹⁸
This office was toxic due in part to active gender discrimination. There were at
most three women on the roster, and she was typically the only woman and
often the youngest. She said that her department had a ‘good old boys’ culture
and that her manger made demeaning remarks to her. She filed official
complaints that went unaddressed. When she eventually left this department,
he had six ongoing investigations. He has since been demoted, but still holds
the same amount of power. The degree of gender-based discrimination varies
across institutions. She said that her new sector promotes diversity and
inclusion. Like other women working in defense, she attributes bad
experiences to individuals and not the military.
The last few women that I spoke with have started working in the
field in the last six years. Their experiences combine the issues of both age and
gender that the other women described above. While working at a defensecentered post, which was full of “military bros”, Hadley, “a tiny Asian girl,” had
a boss who would not close the door to his office “because [he] didn’t want
people getting inappropriate ideas.” When a college tour came to visit her
office, an undergraduate boy responded to her answer saying, “We’re really
here to hear from the senior people” after her supervisor had directed a
question to Hadley. Another undergraduate boy, who was interviewing with
her for an internship, interrupted her and said, “I don’t think you have the
policy expertise to be judging me.” A male intern would similarly disrespect her
authority and ask others if he actually had to do the tasks that she would assign
him. At her current job, she said that she is often demoted in emails from senior
staff. Once, in a meeting with several women from the Executive Branch, a
senior woman asked the room how many kids they all had. When Hadley
replied that she was twenty-three, the women said, “Oh, you better get on it or
your eggs will dry up!”¹⁹ Each of these incidents were derived from some form
18
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of gender and age bias that is not seen nearly as often with men early in their
careers in FP/NS.
Sylvia, who works in the same office as Hadley does, has had very similar
experiences. While in school studying business, she and her female classmates
were instructed in what they should wear for work and how to present
themselves within a “very narrow box of femininity.”²⁰ Later at an unpaid
internship, she said that four out of the six interns were women, but that the
men were given every substantive task while the administrative tasks were
“evenly” divided among the female interns. More recently, at an event that she
helped organize, a male senior official said to her and her female coworkers that
he had “a fiery wife just like them.” Another co-worker, Maddie, experienced
much of the same things. She said that, at meetings, men are able to drag on
while women tend to speak much more concisely. She said that this is because
they do not want to speak too much or be cut off, and that the men are generally
the people who interrupt. This is similar to Morgan’s efforts to be included in
meetings and Leslie’s learned ability to elbow into conversations.
The experiences of women throughout the last thirty years demonstrate
what has and has not changed over the generations. While some women
described individual bias and casual discrimination or harassment, other
women described a broader, institutional bias. The existence of this duality in
women’s experiences indicates that being a woman in FP/NS in the United
States comes with its own forms of discrimination and impediments.
MENTORSHIP

For most of the women I interviewed, there were not a lot of women
present in their early education and careers who were senior enough to be
female mentors for them. This is especially true of women in graduate school
before the 1990’s. The lack of female mentors exacerbated the old boys’
networks by leaving women with only male mentors to help and teach them.
Leslie described how the “network… explains a lot of disparity”, making it
“imperative on men to expand their networks outside of other men.”²¹ When
she was coming up in the field, there were only men. But, in the last five or ten
years, she has been able “to not ignore female voices.”²² Katherine described
how, during the 1980’s, FP/NS had few “prominent women.” But, a selfdescribed outlier, she was raised by female professors and became interested in
the subject after working for a female national security scholar after college.
Her story shows that women being in leadership positions opens up
opportunities for other women, “provid[ing] a cascade effect.” This is true
outside of the United States as well. Laura shared that, while serving abroad,
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she approached ministry officials complaining about the amount of press
coverage she received compared to that given to other US officials. In response,
an official said, “You don’t get it, do you? We don’t have women role models in
high positions in our country.” Laura heard this as, “tag, you’re it.”²³ While she
was stationed in the country, the country ended up appointing several women
to high-level positions.
However, in the face of a male-dominated mentor pool, almost everyone
who I interviewed cited the importance of male mentors and allies in
supporting their work and career advancement. Maddie stated that progress
cannot be achieved alone, saying that “we need white male allies to help. . .it’s
not enough to just say that there’s inequality.”²⁴ When “men join the chorus of
voices advocating for the importance of women’s issues”, other men are more
likely to pay attention and take these issues seriously.²⁵ For all of the men who
were discriminatory and toxic, there were men who worked to support and
advance these women’s careers. Laura said that, “for every jerk I had to deal
with, there were five guys who were on our side” and that, when she was placed
at a controversial post for a woman at the time, her male superiors wanted her
to succeed.”²⁶ Her time working “in the kitchen” as a result of one man’s petty
anger was mitigated by the rest of the men in the office who made sure to bring
her with them to meetings. Additionally, after the head of the mission heard
her story, the aforementioned “jerk” was sent back to Washington where he
was forced to retire. For the women who served in the military, most described
how their male bosses were “on the lookout for increased diversity” both for
gender and race.²⁷ One of Jane’s commanding officers appreciated her
research and candor, and was very helpful in supporting her advancement. On
the civilian side, Katherine’s career was furthered early on when Colin Powell
brought her on as staff, which ensured that she was treated with respect. She
also felt that the institution was looking out for her more broadly. Due to the
assistance and support from male peers and mentors, women have been able to
gradually expand their networks and reach new heights in their careers.
An increase in networking between women has also played an important
role in promoting women’s entry into and empowerment within the FP/NS
establishment. This became more notable under Secretaries of State Madeleine
Albright and Hillary Clinton. When Albright first started working for the State
Department, she began intentionally creating networks of women to expand
the opportunities and connections that were so prominent in the male-sphere.
Prior to her nomination, she described the male networks as being traceable to
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Disengaged and disempowered

ties forged as early as prep school or college, later in entry-level positions in
law firms, or on Capitol Hill. Washington women also have networks, but until
recently these networks were primarily social or philanthropic. Men focused on
power. Women focused on everything but power.
After her appointment, Albright noted that “diplomatic leadership was so
long the domain of men that Henry Kissinger told an audience in 1997 that he
wanted to welcome her to the ‘fraternity’ of Secretaries of State and she
responded, ‘Henry, I hate to tell you, but it’s not a fraternity anymore.’”²⁸ After
Albright’s tenure, Condoleezza Rice and then Hillary Clinton were appointed to
the position. During her time as Secretary of State, Clinton brought women’s
and girls’ security, long a relatively minor aspect of US foreign policy, to the
forefront of U.S. national security. This shift was a monumental achievement
for the rights of women and girls all over the world and placed a reinvigorated
emphasis on women’s empowerment on the domestic front, especially in the
institutions creating and producing foreign policy and security. Her
appointment has had many effects on the gender disparity in the field. While
Clinton was in office, twenty five women were appointed as ambassadors, a
historic first. A woman at the top, especially a lifelong women’s advocate like
Hillary Clinton, made it “easier for a president to pick a woman ambassador for
Washington.”²⁹ In the U.S., “more than half of new recruits for the US Foreign
Service and 20 percent of the chiefs of mission [were] women.”³⁰ With both
male allies helping to pave the way for women and with women occupying
positions at the highest levels of power, women have been able to better achieve
their full potential and become prominent voices in the field.

How depoliticization prevents two-party
Competition in Japan
COOPER PRICE

Democracy, like many concepts in political science, escapes easy
definition. But it’s safe to say that most models of democracy include some
notion of political competition, and of the peaceful transfer of power from one
group to another. As Adam Przeworski puts it, “Democracy is a system in
which parties lose elections.”¹ But by this metric, Japan hardly qualifies as a
democracy. For the vast majority of its postwar history, the country has been
ruled by a single political party - the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP).
After a landmark electoral reform introduced proportional representation in
1994, many observers declared an end to the “1955 system” of LDP
dominance.² For a brief moment in the early 2010s, it seemed that regular
two-party competition between the LDP and Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)
had finally become a reality.³ But the past eight years have seen a return to the
“old days” of LDP control. After a crushing electoral defeat in 2012, the DPJ
was forced back into the political wilderness. In the years since, the LDP has
decisively reestablished its control over the Diet and premiership, while the
opposition has returned to its previous state of fragmentation and electoral
weakness.
The causes of LDP resurgence are varied, and scholars have explored many
potential explanations for the party’s post-2012 recovery. But one area that
has been relatively overlooked is the relationship between LDP success and the
phenomenon known as “depoliticization.” As we will discuss at greater length
in the literature review, depoliticization theorists like Matthew Flinders and
Matt Wood recognize three main forms of depoliticization: governmental,
societal and discursive. In this paper, we will focus on the first two categories.
Governmental depoliticization is generally characterized as the “denial of
political contingency and the transfer of [state] functions away from elected
politicians”.⁴ In the Japanese context, this kind of depoliticization is
manifested through the de facto assumption of control over policymaking
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authority by bureaucratic agencies like the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI), which emerged as the primary originators of economic policy
in the postwar era.⁵ Over the course of this period, the LDP developed a
symbiotic relationship with Japan’s administrative state, and with the
country’s leading corporations. At the height of the 1955 system, scholars like
Chalmers Johnson characterized the LDP regime as a technocracy controlled
by an axis of bureaucrats, professional politicians and business interests.⁶
Societal depoliticization refers to a “sense of diminished interest in public
affairs on the part of the public”.⁷ Such attitudes can be cultivated by a variety
of actors in civil society.
The current literature on LDP electoral strength would benefit from an
analysis of the unique role that depoliticization plays in creating a favorable
political climate for LDP dominance. Scholars like Thomas Feldhoff have
noted that “depoliticisation [sic], which extends across all governing levels in
Japan and across multiple policy spheres, is in the interest of those parties in
power.” Feldhoff says that this “is a key message that has rarely been touched
upon in the literature so far”.⁸
This paper seeks to fill that gap by applying the general model of
depoliticization to the specific case of Japan. We will explore the ways in which
historical, social and political factors have contributed to widespread societal
and governmental depoliticization, and how these processes laid the
groundwork for the LDP’s post-2012 resurgence. We will examine how the two
aforementioned forms of depoliticization reinforce each other in
contemporary Japan, exemplifying the “interplay” between governmental and
societal depoliticization that Wood and Flinders describe in their 2014 article
“Rethinking Depoliticisation: Beyond the Governmental.”⁹ In the Japanese
case, linkages between governmental and societal depoliticization are
particularly clear with regard to the 2009-12 DPJ government and its failure
to forge a strong two-party system. The DPJ’s failure, which was caused in
large part by governmental depoliticization, contributed to societal
depoliticization in the long run (as expressed by low voter turnout and
generally limited political participation).
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First, we discuss the scholarly literature on LDP dominance, analyzing some of
the most important factors behind the party’s half-century of electoral success.
Then we examine the ways in which governmental depoliticization prevented
the DPJ from fulfilling its electoral mandate during the party’s brief stint in
government from 2009-12, and how this failure may have contributed to
internal splits within the opposition (which increased the LDP’s electoral
strength) and fueled societal depoliticization. Next, we discuss the
depoliticizing role played by the Japanese educational system and the media,
and the broader relationship between societal depoliticization and LDP
success. Finally, we consider the implications of depoliticization for Japan’s
political future.
LITERATURE REVIEW

In the second half of the twentieth century, the “dominant-party” model of
democracy (as exemplified by cases like South Korea, Taiwan, Mexico and
Italy) seemed to present a strong alternative to competitive, multiparty
democracy. But the last few decades have generally seen a decline in the
prevalence of dominant party systems. This trend can be observed in countries
as diverse as Italy, Mexico, South Korea and Taiwan. But the Japanese Liberal
Democratic Party is a notable outlier in its avoidance of dominant party
decline. While the LDP can no longer claim to be electorally undefeated, the
party has still governed (whether as a majority or in coalition) for roughly 22
out of the 26 years since the end of the one and a half party system. This record
is especially unusual in light of the fact that Japan has possessed ostensibly
democratic political institutions since 1947. Furthermore, it sets Japan apart
from neighboring countries like South Korea and Taiwan, which both
overcame a legacy of single-party dominance. While there are some major
historical and political differences between these three countries, they are a
compelling set of cases to compare. All three followed a general policy of stateled capitalist development for most of the 20th century. They also share
similar long-term economic challenges (e.g. aging demographics and
diminished GDP growth prospects), broadly comparable electoral systems,
and the common institutional legacy of Imperial Japan.¹¹ South Korea, in
particular, seems an apt counter model as the various iterations of Korea’s
conservative dominant party were “deliberately modeled” after the LDP.¹² In
addition, the election of Korean leftist Kim Dae Jung in 1997 was an example
of the opposition overthrowing a once-dominant party in the wake of a major
economic disaster (the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis) that revealed the failings
of the status quo. The 2008 recession provided a similar opportunity for the
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Japanese opposition, but the DPJ government collapsed after just four years
in power (and hasn’t regained control in the eight years since).
Despite the aforementioned similarities in political climate, center-left
opposition parties in South Korea and Taiwan have repeatedly outperformed
their Japanese counterparts in recent years.¹³ This raises an important
question: how has the LDP managed to overcome the post-Cold War
legitimacy crisis (that felled virtually all other dominant party democratic
regimes) and survived as a viable, and arguably still monopolistic, political
force? Scholars have not come to any definitive consensus with regard to the
causes of continued LDP dominance, but a variety of different explanations
have been proposed.
Some scholars, like Karen Cox and Leonard Schoppa, have observed that
the LDP exploits certain weaknesses built into Japan’s election reform laws.
One such weakness is the fact that Japanese law does not allow candidates in
single-member districts to list themselves under multiple party tickets. This
creates a structural disadvantage for small parties in Japan, as they must take
the “ad hoc approach of running candidates here and there”.¹⁴ Minor parties
in Italy are spared this problem thanks to electoral reform legislation enacted
in the 1990s, which allowed for multi-ticket candidates.
More significantly, the LDP enjoys several big structural advantages
which reforms have been incapable of eliminating thus far. One of these
advantages is the disproportionate voting power of pro-LDP rural districts.
The LDP has long relied on the rural vote as a key pillar of support, and it
continues to do so today. The party “systematically [wins] rural constituencies
with low ratios of population to representative,” as this group is especially
“dependent on redistributive benefits” to which the LDP possesses “nearly
uninterrupted access”.¹⁵ As Masahisa Endo, Robert Pekkanen and Robert
Reed point out in “The LDP’s Path Back to Power,” the agricultural lobby’s
continued alignment with the LDP helped the party mobilize voters to unseat
the DPJ’s legislative majority in 2012.¹⁶
This brand of pork-barrel politics speaks to a larger underlying factor
that Japanese reformers have not sufficiently addressed: pervasive clientelism.
This clientelism largely benefits the LDP, as noted by scholars like Ethan
Scheiner and Filippo Tronconi. This is because the country’s “clientelistic and
centralized governmental system” ensures that the ruling party/coalition in
the Diet has great control over dispersal of funds at all levels of government.¹⁷
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This creates incentives for local politicians to align themselves with the party
most likely to win national elections (and therefore best able to dispense
patronage/pork barrel spending to their district). The LDP has had decades to
build up a network of fiercely loyal politicians, who enjoy firm support from
koenkai.¹⁸ Thus, even after substantial electoral reform, the LDP still enjoys
the advantage of a “deep pool of local politicians who could mobilize voters for
the party”.¹⁹ Organizationally speaking, it has proven difficult for the
opposition to catch up. Ellis Krauss and Robert Pekkanen also emphasize the
continued role of koenkai in the LDP party machine, arguing that koenkai are
useful in gathering the votes of “ticket-splitters” who vote for opposition
parties in PR contests but are persuaded to vote LDP in SMD races due to the
influence of “personal” politics.²⁰ This kind of particularism has gone “hand in
hand” with outright corruption and “money-power politics”.²¹ As the largest,
most well-organized and well-funded party in Japan, it stands to reason that
the LDP would thrive in such a political climate.
Finally, the LDP’s success is undoubtedly aided by high levels of
factionalism and fracturing among Japan’s numerous opposition parties. Like
many of the aforementioned factors, this is a long standing issue. In the 2000
election, for example, a failure to coordinate among the various opposition
parties granted the LDP around 68 more district seats than it would have
otherwise gained - enough to tip the balance of power in the Lower House.²²
This kind of result was typical until the 2000s, when the opposition began to
consolidate in earnest around the DPJ. But the DPJ proved vulnerable to
fragmentation, and collapsed entirely in the mid-2010s.²³
While each of the aforementioned explanations may hold some
explanatory power, the literature on LDP dominance would benefit from an
application of depoliticization theory to the Japanese case. There is already
some scholarly support for a “depoliticization hypothesis” to (at least partially)
explain the LDP’s resilience. Eric C. Browne and Kim Sunwoong claim that the
failure of dominant parties like Italy’s Christian Democracy (CD) and Mexico’s
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was primarily caused by an erosion of
voter confidence (due to decades of corruption), which grew so intense that it
triggered party fragmentation as breakaway factions saw an opportunity to
capitalize on anti-establishment fervor. In Japan, however, erosion of voter
confidence hasn’t led to widespread support for opposition parties. Instead, it
has generated “apathy toward the political system itself”.²⁴ This has led to
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decline in turnout and participation. While Browne and Kim frame these
trends as a weakness for the LDP, it could be interpreted as a strength because
apathy prevents the emergence of a bottom-up political movement that could
generate grassroots opposition outside of the LDP-dominated system of
formal electoral politics. Furthermore, the LDP’s superior ability to mobilize
the “organized vote” (through well-developed koenkai networks) gives the
party a general advantage in low-turnout elections. This view is reinforced by
Hirotaka Kasai, who claims that Japan’s business and political elite have
intentionally fostered a climate of cynicism and indifference towards Japan’s
constitutional principles, in order to facilitate the acceptance of undemocratic
policies that protect those in power from public scrutiny.²⁵ Examples of such
policies include the anti-transparency State Secrets Law enacted in 2013.²⁶
While Browne, Kim, Kasai and others have identified a general culture of
apathy and “depoliticization,” there does not yet appear to be a firm scholarly
consensus regarding the root causes of Japanese depoliticization, nor has
there been sufficient analysis of the relationship between depoliticization and
LDP dominance.
This paper will analyze the Japanese case by applying a theory of
depoliticization advanced by Matthew Flinders and Matt Wood, who have
emerged as leading scholars on the subject in recent years. In “Rethinking
Depoliticization: Beyond the Governmental”, Wood and Flinders distinguish
between three separate but mutually reinforcing categories of depoliticization.
The first is “governmental” depoliticization, which is characterized as a
mode of statecraft that transfers decision making responsibility away from
actors who can be held directly accountable to the public (e.g. elected officials)
and places it in the hands of “apolitical” institutions like regulatory agencies,
central banks, and the judiciary.²⁷
The second is “societal” depoliticization, which encompasses any process
by which the “social deliberation surrounding [political issues] gradually
erodes,” often resulting in low levels of political participation among the
citizenry.²⁸ This kind of depoliticization can be carried out by a wide range of
actors in civil society, including media outlets, social movements and business
associations.²⁹
The final category of depoliticization is “discursive.” Discursive
depoliticization refers to the use of ideas and language as a tool to “naturalize”
political issues by making certain options seem inevitable, and opposition to
those options irrational.³⁰ This concept draws on the work of Marxist
25
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philosopher Antonio Gramsci, who emphasized “the role of language and
culture in relation to political debates.”³¹ There is a great deal of overlap
between discursive and societal depoliticization, as “these two forms or modes
of depoliticisation are both distinctive, interrelated, and to some extent even
parasitical”.³² For the purposes of this paper, we will limit ourselves to a
discussion of societal and governmental depoliticization, for two main
reasons. First, discursive depoliticization is often produced by the same actors
(in the state and civil society) as societal depoliticization. Second, a proper
understanding of discursive depoliticization requires an extensive
engagement with theoretical literature that is beyond the limited scope of this
paper. Discursive techniques are employed by many of the same institutions
that promote societal depoliticization, such as the media and education
system.
Having established a basic understanding of depoliticization and its two
main forms (governmental and societal), we can now discuss the role that each
type of depoliticization plays in the LDP’s return to power. We will begin with
governmental depoliticization.
GOVERNMENTAL DEPOLITICIZATION AND THE DPJ’S FAILURE

Governmental depoliticization has a complex and important relationship
to the Japanese case. The LDP has traditionally maintained a tacit
arrangement with Japan’s powerful, highly autonomous bureaucracy. For
much of the postwar era, bureaucratic agencies were allowed to take the lead
in the policymaking process, and the role of the LDP-controlled Diet was to
approve (or occasionally reject) bureaucratic proposals. This technocratic
system is a clear example of governmental depoliticization, as the legislature
and prime minister (the democratically accountable branches of government)
generally take their cue from unelected policy experts and the private business
interests that the bureaucracy tends to represent due to Japan’s amakudari
system (an implicit quid pro quo exchange which involves state officials being
rewarded with lucrative positions on the boards of companies they were
charged with overseeing, in return for lax regulation).³³
In 2009, it seemed like things might finally change. Taking advantage of
1990s-era electoral reforms and a succession of short-lived, scandal-ridden
LDP premierships, the DPJ won a landmark electoral victory “by promising to
turn politicians into the true decision-makers and end the practice of
bureaucrats calling the shots on behalf of ministries instead of the people”.³⁴
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Prime Minister Hatoyama pledged to act on this electoral mandate, and
implement a “shift in ‘sovereignty’ [...] to end the bureaucracy-controlled
government and establish a true people-centered government”.³⁵ Hatoyama
planned to achieve this grand promise through a set of institutional reforms.
The new administration quickly moved to abolish vice-ministerial meetings
(which were traditionally a vehicle for the bureaucracy to decide on policy that
the politicians would subsequently enact). Hatoyama’s government also
created an administrative firewall between politicians and bureaucrats,
constraining the latter to the role of “providing basic data and information”
rather than determining what policies are actually implemented.³⁶ The overall
goal was the transfer of policymaking authority away from unelected, LDP-era
bureaucrats and its centralization in the hands of elected DPJ cabinet
ministers.³⁷
Unfortunately for the DPJ’s would-be reformers, decades of
governmental depoliticization had swollen the bureaucracy’s role in
governance to such an extent that bureaucratic compliance was necessary to
accomplish virtually any policy objectives. Political appointees lacked the
policy experience to effectively manage their ministries without direction from
career officials, and the sudden exclusion of career officials damaged
bureaucratic morale.³⁸ The abolition of vice-ministerial meetings also
backfired in many respects. Under the old system, the prime minister would
influence policy making by informally participating in vice-ministerial
meetings to communicate the government’s agenda to bureaucrats (using the
deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary as an intermediary). The loss of this
communication channel created a disconnect between the policymakers who
made the decisions and the officials responsible for implementing them.³⁹ The
deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary (CCS) could no longer function as the prime
minister’s liaison to the bureaucracy, and as a result the cabinet’s policy
making power actually weakened.⁴⁰ Over the next few years, the DPJ’s poor
relationship with the bureaucracy would result in a series of policy failures,
dooming the reformers’ dream of repoliticizing Japan’s governing process.
Ironically, the long-term effect of DPJ rule was increased societal
depoliticization, as indicated by steadily decreasing voter turnout rates in
recent elections.⁴¹
The costs of breaking with the bureaucracy had already begun to
materialize by 2010. Hatoyama resigned his premiership on June 2, after
abandoning a campaign pledge to relocate Marine Corps Air Station Futenma,

base relocation in a negative light.⁴² The Japanese media, for reasons we will
later explain, is typically willing to report official leaks with little corroboration
or context, and this case was no exception. The press “utterly [failed] to
explain to the people the true nature of the power struggle that was going on
or to treat the leakers with a due degree of skepticism.”⁴³ As a result,
Hatoyama “completely surrendered” and abandoned the relocation effort.⁴⁴
Under Hatoyama’s successor Kan Naoto, it became even clearer that the
DPJ could not effectively govern without bureaucratic support. During his
time as Hatoyama’s finance minister, Kan’s lack of economic expertise had
forced him to rely on memos prepared by bureaucratic advisors. This
experience changed his prior anti-bureaucratic outlook, and when Kan
became prime minister he took several measures to break down Hatoyama’s
“firewall” between politicians and career officials.⁴⁵ Still, Kan refused to
reinstate the vice-ministerial meetings, despite “basically admitt[ing] that the
old vice-ministerial meeting was necessary for policy coordination”.⁴⁶
In 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake and subsequent FukushimaDaiichi nuclear meltdown would test the limits of the DPJ’s ability to govern
without bureaucratic direction. This disaster revealed the pitfalls of
Hatoyama’s hardline reform effort, as “inter-agency coordination was needed
at various working levels” to address the myriad of problems caused by the
earthquake and meltdown.⁴⁷ Since the DPJ had “identified inter-agency
policy coordination as the jurisdiction of political leaders” and had limited
bureaucrats’ ability to contact officials or politicians from other ministries, the
“network for inter-agency coordination within the government [...] had
basically been destroyed.” Poor coordination greatly delayed the government’s
response in regard to certain forms of complicated relief assistance which
required involvement by multiple ministries.⁴⁸ This “crisis of crisis
management” was politically devastating for Kan, and a vote of no confidence
forced his resignation in August of 2011.⁴⁹
The failures of Hatoyama and Kan would haunt the next DPJ prime
minister, Noda Yoshihiko. Understanding that path dependency had limited
the DPJ’s ability to govern without heavy bureaucratic input, Noda quickly
reintroduced the vice-ministerial meeting (in all but name), and generally
allowed the bureaucracy to re-acquire its hold on the reins of power.⁵⁰ Not
only did Noda demolish what was left of the Hatoyama-era “firewall”, he also
proved willing to reverse long standing DPJ political stances upon urging from
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his technocratic advisors. Specifically, Noda acquiesced to an increase in the
consumption tax that was proposed by Ministry of Finance officials.⁵¹ This
move was particularly controversial because the DPJ’s 2009 manifesto had
promised that the party “would not try to raise the levy during the four-year
terms of its Lower House ranks”.⁵² The consumption tax hike was in keeping
with previous increases that the MOF and Treasury had pressured Japanese
governments to propose in the past, despite the typical effect of a “significant
reduction in popularity immediately after [...] raising the possibility of tax
legislation”.⁵³ Thus, Noda’s decision to raise the tax, despite the political risks,
demonstrated the enduring strength of bureaucrats’ agenda-setting power.
As a result, Noda’s administration alienated followers of Ozawa Ichiro, a
powerful factional leader within the DPJ. This anti-Noda contingent felt
betrayed by the Prime Minister’s consumption tax increase and moderate
position on nuclear power. As a result, the party underwent a major split
between Ozawa’s allies and Noda loyalists. Opposition fracturing was a major
factor in smoothing the LDP’s path back to dominant-party status, and at the
present moment the opposition is weaker and more disunified than it has been
at any point since the end of the 1955 system.⁵⁴ This process of fracturing was
accelerated by the 2012 election,⁵⁵ and the LDP has managed to win six
consecutive elections over the course of the decade in the face of opposition
weakness and division.⁵⁶
After years of policy failure, the DPJ under Noda had more or less
capitulated to the Japanese bureaucracy. Generations of governmental
depoliticization had fostered a system in which autonomous inter-agency
coordination (and institutions like the vice-ministerial meeting) were essential
for the effective implementation of policy, especially in a crisis like the
Fukushima meltdown. The DPJ’s inability to repoliticize the governing
process contributed to its electoral downfall in 2012, and to the resurgence of
the LDP as a dominant party in the mid to late 2010s. After successive DPJ
governments either abandoned, reversed or failed to implement their
campaign promises, voters were left “completely confused about what the DPJ
stood for.”⁵⁷ This brings us to the second type of depoliticization described by
Flinders and Wood: societal depoliticization.
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SOCIETAL DEPOLITICIZATION AND LDP ELECTORAL SUCCESS

The DPJ’s failure to fulfill its electoral mandate had a depoliticizing effect
on voters who had hoped in 2009 that the LDP-bureaucratic establishment
would be overcome by a DPJ government. Accordingly, the 2012 election saw
“irresistible apathy on the part of the electorate,”⁵⁸ and the LDP won in a
landslide. Voter disillusionment appears to have persisted, as the LDP won
repeatedly throughout the mid-late 2010s in low-turnout contests. As we will
soon discuss, there is evidence that these low-turnout elections accentuated
the LDP’s organizational advantages and strengthened the party’s position.
The conclusion is clear – “would-be challengers [to the LDP] must find a way
to turn [voters] out and keep them active for more than just a single
election.”⁵⁹ By reneging on its 2009 commitment to end the bureaucracy’s
stranglehold on policy making, the DPJ lost the credibility necessary to
mobilize disaffected voters.
By preventing the DPJ from fulfilling its 2009 electoral mandate,
governmental depoliticization foreclosed the possibility of systemic change
that might repoliticize the populace and spur future opposition victories.
Policy reversals and electoral failure contributed to DPJ (later renamed the
Democratic Party) fracturing and the collapse of Japan’s nascent two-party
system. Thus, we can see that the relationship between governmental and
societal depoliticization is crucial to understanding how Japan “missed its
chance” (for the time being) to fully institutionalize two-party competition.
The impact of societal depoliticization on LDP success is twofold. First,
citizens’ sense of disinterest/disinvestment in politics leads to a decreased
interest in electoral participation. Considering the fact that low voter turnout
has likely benefited the LDP in recent elections,⁶⁰ this is a boon for the ruling
party. A strong case can be made that the “disappointed deactivation” of
“casual voters” helped cause the DPJ’s loss in 2012.⁶¹ Additionally, societal
depoliticization may be at least partially to blame for the lack of an electorally
viable populist movement in Japan. While Japan’s employment rate is
significantly above the OECD average,⁶² Japan faces rising economic
inequality⁶³ and slow wage growth;⁶⁴ problems which have triggered the rise
of populism elsewhere. But new populist parties like Reiwa Shinsengumi have
thus far failed to gain much traction in the Japanese political landscape. And
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while the post-Fukushima era has seen a number of mass demonstrations,
these events have largely failed to coalesce into a politically effective grassroots
pressure campaign. To be sure, societal depoliticization is far from the only
factor that stymies populism and grassroots protest in Japan. But it seems
likely that this type of depoliticization plays some role, for as the next section
will go on to show, societal depoliticization is associated with a decreased
interest in informal political participation.
Our discussion of societal depoliticization will be divided into two parts.
First, we will introduce the concept of “political citizenship,” and explain how
it relates to depoliticization (specifically, in the context of the Japanese
educational system). Then, we will discuss the role of the Japanese media in
undermining active political citizenship and thereby increasing societal
depoliticization.
PART I – POLITICAL CITIZENSHIP

Like depoliticization, political citizenship is a broad and fluid concept.
Here, we will use the definition provided by Bernard Crick: political
citizenship constitutes an "'involvement in public affairs by those who [have]
the rights of citizens: to take part in public debate and, directly or indirectly, in
shaping the laws and decisions of a state.'"⁶⁵ In other words, political
citizenship requires more than legal obligation or national identification; it
requires that the citizen actually engage with the institutions that govern their
country. The link between political citizenship and societal depoliticization is
clear. If a nation’s citizens do not actively engage with the institutions that
govern their country, then it seems to follow that the citizenry in question has
been depoliticized. Thus, when determining whether or not a Japanese
institution contributes to societal depoliticization, we will use the promotion
(or discouragement) of political citizenship as our primary metric.
The first institution that we will consider is the Japanese education
system. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the American
Occupation government made a brief effort to “democratize” Japan’s school
system. Aiming to create a “thick” democracy in Japan, the United States tried
to inculcate democratic values by introducing a “citizenship education
curriculum” that might “nurture a cohort of youth who could then later on
function as active political citizens in Japanese democracy”.⁶⁶ However, this
focus on democratization was short-lived and the civic education program was
“never [...] firmly institutionalised [sic.] in post war Japan.”⁶⁷ Civic education
efforts fell victim to a broader policy shift in the early years of the Cold War, as
the U.S. decided that its geopolitical interests were best served by propping up
65
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the LDP and “prioritizing ‘economic rehabilitation’” over democratization.⁶⁸
In ensuing decades, the “political socialisation [sic.] process which is seen as
essential for establishing and nurturing political citizenship[...], especially so
for a society that had never operated under popular sovereignty, [was] seen to
have been poorly institutionalized.”⁶⁹ As a result, contemporary Japanese
civic education is not particularly robust. While Japanese law mandates that
schools promote a “public mindset,” students are not generally taught more
than the “basic facts about democracy and social rules,” and they are not often
“required to take part in rule/policy making” exercises or given lessons
concerning the “broader meaning of political skills.” Essentially, Japanese
students are “taught to ‘obey rules’ but are not taught how to make them”.⁷⁰
Overall, political citizenship is ignored (if not actively discouraged) by the
Japanese education system.
The de-emphasis of political citizenship has a close relationship with
overall societal depoliticization. The Japanese people are certainly legal
citizens of their democracy, and national identity is strong in Japan. But
neither legal nor national citizenship demands the kind of deep civic
engagement that political citizenship does. A study commissioned by Tohoku
University in 2015 indicated that Japanese students are “highly accustomed to
the role as a ‘recipient’ of politics and political services”, rather than the role of
active participant.⁷¹ This “recipient" model of political engagement implies a
hard separation between the political class and ordinary people, wherein the
“decision makers” are not part of the same body politic as their constituents.
This worldview is profoundly incompatible with a strong concept of political
citizenship, and seems to reveal a high level of societal depoliticization among
Japanese youth. The survey subjects tended to see politics as a temporary
action, centered around periodic votes or circumscribed moments of
engagement.⁷² Furthermore, the students were often cynical towards voting/
formal participation, but simultaneously uninterested in or critical of
demonstrations/informal politics. While many students expressed a desire to
make positive change in society, they felt as though the avenues of political
action available to them (both formal and informal) were ineffective.⁷³
Generally speaking, there “appears to be a missing ‘pipe’ that sufficiently
connects the interest and concerns that youth have toward society, with
politics and action”.⁷⁴ As previously discussed, one reason for the absence of
such a “pipe” is the lack of substantive civics education in Japanese schools.
Alongside the education system, the Japanese media has also failed to “[equip]
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the youth with the concepts, values, and skills to function as political citizens
in a democracy”.⁷⁵ As we will discuss at length in the following section, the
Japanese press has systematically colluded with the LDP-dominated state
bureaucracy, decisively failing to promote the “sense of ‘inclusion’ [...] in the
political arena” that is necessary for the development of strong political
citizenship.⁷⁶
PART II – THE MEDIA

The media is one of the most important agents in the process of societal
depoliticization, as news outlets are deeply involved with shaping our
interpretation of information. As Laurie Ann Freeman explains in Closing the
Shop: Information Cartels and Japan’s Mass Media, “the power of the media
resides [...] in their ability to channel information and ideas (both to and from
elites, to and from society), to influence the setting and framing of political and
social agendas, and to legitimize certain political economic or social groups
and ideas as they delegitimize others”.⁷⁷ This power functions as a
depoliticizing force in Japanese society (largely to the benefit of the LDP).
Large, mainstream media outlets in Japan tend to frame themselves as
“impartial” and “nonpolitical,” so as to appeal to as wide a reader/viewership
as possible. But the “neutrality” of Japanese media is “that of the closely linked
insider who rarely challenges the status quo”.⁷⁸ Reporters are so closely tied
to the LDP-dominated state ministries that they routinely present progovernment narratives as the only legitimate viewpoint, often basing their
articles very closely on pre-approved press releases.⁷⁹ Certainly, journalists in
other democracies also enjoy close working relationships with government
officials. But Japanese reporters tend to rely on official sources to a far greater
degree than their foreign counterparts. At the turn of the millennium, it was
estimated that up to 90 percent of reporting is based on information provided
by government (and therefore, generally LDP-aligned) sources.⁸⁰ Despite
reform efforts under the 2009-12 DPJ government, media-state relations in
Japan have remained significantly closer than in most other developed
democracies.
This symbiotic relationship between state and media is explained by a
number of institutional arrangements. The Japanese press has often been
characterized as an “information cartel.” This means that newsgathering is
organized according to a set of rules and relationships that “limit the types of
news that get reported and the number and makeup of those who do the
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reporting”.⁸¹ The Japanese media landscape is dominated by collegial
organizations called kisha clubs, which are composed of journalists from
various media outlets. Their purpose is to streamline newsgathering in one
particular area of government – for example, one kisha club might cover the
Ministry of Finance, while another might focus on the Prime Minister and his
cabinet. The members of these clubs are allowed exclusive access to official
sources in their assigned area of government, but in exchange they are
expected to practice self-censorship at the risk of expulsion from the club.⁸²
Kisha reporting is governed by a set of implicit norms, such as the infrequency
of exclusive interviews with sources,⁸³ vague attribution (or outright nonattribution) of quotes from government officials,⁸⁴ and “secret briefings” for
club members that lack the transparency of public press conferences.⁸⁵
These arrangements are mutually beneficial for both the kisha members
and their sources. The journalists are “entitled” to a certain degree of
information-sharing by their sources, and they can generally expect equitable
distribution of this information among all members of the club, with
limitations on favoritism for certain reporters over others.⁸⁶ In exchange,
government officials are able to control the dissemination of information and
avoid being blindsided by unfavorable news stories. Scandals are rarely
broken by kisha club reporters,⁸⁷ and limitations on information exchange
between members of different clubs prevents coordination between
journalists specializing in different areas. This prevents the kind of
collaboration necessary to break big, investigative stories that expose
government corruption.⁸⁸ Furthermore, the compensation structure of large
Japanese media firms creates a strong incentive for reporters to follow the
rules. Many of these companies adhere to a system of more-or-less lifelong
employment, wherein “employees with permanent positions know that if they
lose their job and re-enter the job market at middle age, they may never work
again.” Therefore, “‘[anyone] transgressing the kisha system runs the risk of
losing access and having their career derailed[...] in clinging to this privileged
access, the media[…] becomes beholden to the officials and institutions they
are supposed to cover’”.⁸⁹
While the kisha club cartels may be beneficial for journalists and
bureaucrats alike, those benefits come at the expense of the news-consuming
public. Not only is the public less aware of scandals but everyday reporting is
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done in the style of “press release journalism.” This term derisively refers to
the practice of uncritically repeating official talking points (originating in
government press releases) without doing any outside investigation to
corroborate official claims or find dissenting perspectives.⁹⁰ Cloaked in a
veneer of “impartiality,” press release journalism is nonetheless a “denial of
the existence of choice” that serves to dim public awareness of any political
opposition to the government’s agenda. Considering that the LDP has
maintained a monopoly on political power for the vast majority of Japan’s
postwar history, media-state collusion has generally benefited the LDP and
marginalized its opposition. This dynamic has led Freeman to conclude that
Japan’s cozy media-state relationship is “certainly one of [the factors]”
keeping the LDP in power.⁹¹
The rise of non-print media has proven little obstacle to the kisha system.
Televised news broadcasters are owned by the same major companies that
control newspaper circulation in Japan, and corporate policy typically limits
the independent reporting abilities of television journalists, such that their
primary function is to report on stories that have already been broken by kisha
newspaper reporters. This produces a homogenized media landscape across
multiple platforms, and enables the continued primacy of “press release
journalism” in Japan’s modern media landscape.⁹² The proliferation of digital
media does not appear to have upset this dynamic, as television and print
media continue to play a commanding role in the landscape of Japanese
political news.⁹³ If online, alternative media does in fact possess the potential
to open up Japan’s media shop, then that potential remains untapped for the
time being. Regardless, online media outlets are not immune to the pressures
of kisha-style reporting, as they can still be denied access to official sources
unless they submit to self-censorship.
During the DPJ’s stint in government from 2009-12, the kisha clubs saw
the first real challenge to their stranglehold on political reporting. Prime
Minister Hatoyama Yukio pledged to open up the “closed shop” that controlled
Japanese media, a move that was clearly in the party’s “self-interest since the
DPJ felt Japan’s closed media system favored its Liberal Democratic Party
rivals”.⁹⁴ Hatoyama tried to move away from exclusive, kisha-only briefings in
favor of more transparent press conferences that allowed in foreign journalists
and non-kisha “freelancers” (two groups that the Japanese media
establishment distrusts due to their nonadherence to kisha club rules). Many
of his cabinet ministers soon followed suit. Hatoyama also formally disclosed
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the existence of an LDP-era “slush fund” that prime ministers had used to
“curry political favor” among journalists. However, these actions did not
fundamentally change the kisha system, and the return of the LDP in 2012
foreclosed the possibility of more substantive reforms.⁹⁵
Under the leadership of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the LDP has
systematically worked to re-entrench the country’s media cartel. At
government press conferences, Abe rarely takes questions from non-kisha
journalists. On the rare occasion that the Prime Minister or one of his Cabinet
members faces real scrutiny (usually from foreign or freelance reporters), the
resulting stories fail to gain traction in the broader media landscape. For
example, in 2015 Abe was questioned on his government’s refugee policy by a
Reuters reporter. His answer, which suggested that “he had not seriously
considered the refugee issue”, was widely circulated through the global media
ecosystem while remaining “mostly ignored by the big media in Japan”.⁹⁶
But Abe has done far more than simply reinforce pre-existing norms
regarding media behavior. His administration has taken aggressive steps to
incentivize self-censorship in the Japanese press, enacting security legislation
that restricts the public’s access to information. The Abe government has also
used informal techniques of coercion to intimidate media organizations like
the newspaper Asahi Shimbun, a liberal paper that has been openly critical of
the Prime Minister.⁹⁷
Since its return to power in the early 2010s, the LDP has enacted
controversial laws that restrict speech and press freedoms. Most significant for
the Japanese media is the 2013 State Secrets Law. This deeply unpopular law
gave the government great discretion regarding what information can be
classified as a “state secret” and concealed from the press and public.⁹⁸ The
law also increased the penalties for leaking classified information. Critics
worry that this law allows the LDP government to exercise even stricter control
over the public dissemination of information. The government has officially
stated that nuclear power could be considered a national security issue under
this law, which raised concerns in 2014 that the State Secrets Law would be
used to conceal government incompetence or malfeasance surrounding the
Fukushima meltdown response.⁹⁹
For the time being, these concerns remain largely hypothetical. But when
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it comes to the informal suppression of dissenting media, the Abe government
has taken much more concrete action. The administration and its right-wing
supporters have repeatedly attacked the Asahi over its coverage of
controversial historical issues (like the so-called “comfort women” of World
War II), and television broadcasters like NHK have been pressured to selfcensor under the implicit threat of funding loss (as the company’s license fee
revenue depends on government approval).¹⁰⁰ This pressure is suspected to
have caused the firing of three anti-Abe television anchors in March of
2016.¹⁰¹ That same year, Abe’s communications minister publicly asserted
that the government has the authority to censor “politically biased”
broadcasters.¹⁰² Although this sweeping claim has not yet been acted upon, it
illustrates the administration’s attitude of intolerance towards dissent. NGOs
have recognized this turn towards press restriction. The media watchdog
organization Reporters Without Borders lowered Japan’s “press freedom”
ranking in 2016 from 61st to 72nd (out of 180 states).¹⁰³ Today, Japan still
stands diminished at 66th place in the organization’s press freedom index.¹⁰⁴
As previously mentioned, this overrepresentation of government
viewpoints contributes to societal depoliticization. Since the quality of
discourse in a democratic polity is shaped by “the way in which [...]
information is generated and disseminated”,¹⁰⁵ the kisha clubs’ press release
journalism is actively damaging to the opposition’s ability to mobilize voters
and rally them against the LDP-dominated political establishment. This is an
example of the “denial of the existence of choice” that Wood and Flinders
argue is central to societal depoliticization. When the official narrative
becomes the only legitimate one, room for political contestation is removed.
We can see the depoliticizing effects of this process in the 2014 general election
campaign, when opposition viewpoints were systematically undercovered by
the mainstream media, likely encouraging low voter turnout.¹⁰⁶ Low turnout
was particularly beneficial for conservative incumbents in rural areas, as the
“organized vote” of LDP-aligned agricultural cooperatives “gains more weight
when the overall voter turnout declines.”¹⁰⁷ In the same electoral cycle, some
observers also criticized “non-transparency and the biased reporting by the
mainstream media” surrounding the then-ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) trade negotiations.¹⁰⁸ Trade liberalization is a particularly sensitive
issue for the LDP, because it is unpopular with the party’s all-important rural
constituency and is often opposed by the powerful “agricultural policy
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community”.¹⁰⁹ Thus, the LDP benefits from reporting that “continues to
downplay or even ignore critical issues”¹¹⁰ like the proposed trade pact.
Through the promotion of official views at the expense of dissenting ones,
Japanese media outlets serve as de facto “social managers,” undercovering
opposition forces, ignoring controversial issues, and often undermining
protest movements by “showing institutionalized means of conflict resolution
(court cases, meeting with bureaucrats, etc.) in a neutral light while casting
opprobrium over more confrontational, grass-roots activities (human
barricades, etc.)”.¹¹¹ An example of this can be seen in the media coverage of
mass protests that broke out in the wake of the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear
disaster. These demonstrations were given relatively little attention in the
mainstream press, particularly the major conservative paper Yomiuri
Shimbun.¹¹²
Under the kisha club-dominated mode of journalism, “[controversial]
stories are not pursued, wayward politicians are not held accountable, and the
public is [often] left ignorant of fundamental incongruencies in its own
political and economic system”.¹¹³ The kisha clubs discourage serious
“watchdog” reporting on the part of mainstream journalists, and their
exclusive nature cuts off information access for the alternative media outlets
that actually are engaging in independent journalism (e.g. freelance
journalists, foreign reporters and news magazines). Multimedia keiretsu
groups ensure that uncritical “press release journalism” is dominant across all
major media platforms. Finally, the “impartial” public stance of many of these
media outlets discourages critical examination of LDP talking points by
framing them as objective truth. Each of these dynamics contributes to societal
depoliticization and weakens the average person’s sense of political
citizenship, as previously mentioned. If problems are ignored and solutions
are not presented, it is little wonder that an increasing number of Japanese
citizens feel apathetic towards (and are disengaged with) politics.
CONCLUSION: CONNECTING THE THREADS OF DEPOLITICIZATION

To be sure, depoliticization is far from a “silver bullet” explanation that
fully accounts for the LDP’s return to dominant-party status in recent years.
Since the LDP’s loss in 2009 occurred under a set of fairly special and unique
circumstances (which were no longer present by 2012), perhaps some level of
“pendulum swing” back to the LDP was inevitable, regardless of the outcome
of the DPJ’s struggle against the bureaucracy. There were numerous other
factors at play in the 2009 general election, such as the political reverberations
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of the Great Recession, which saw governing parties thrown out of office in
other parts of the world as well. Also, the LDP faced a number of inconvenient
problems/political setbacks around that time, such as a scandal involving the
mass disappearance of employee pension records.¹¹⁴ It is entirely possible
that without this “perfect storm” the LDP would not have lost in 2009, or at
least not by such an immense margin. But all things considered, it is clear that
societal and governmental depoliticization have played at least some role in
smoothing the LDP’s path back to power. Societal depoliticization has long
served to benefit the ruling party, as the postwar education system
discouraged the development of meaningful political citizenship and the
media collaborated with LDP politicians and bureaucrats to restrict the
public’s access to information regarding the “fundamental incongruencies in
its political system” (and regarding the opposition’s response to these
incongruencies).¹¹⁵ Neither of these institutions has been substantively
reformed - Tsukada’s 2015 study indicates that the education system is still
depoliticizing students, and the LDP-press relationship has gotten even more
controlling than the days of Closing the Shop.

Comprehensive Climate Change
policy

All things considered, the LDP’s resurgence confirms Wood and Flinders’
argument that the different forms of depoliticization are mutually reinforcing.
Decades of governmental depoliticization left the opposition party unprepared
to manage the affairs of state without direction from bureaucrats, leading to a
string of policy failures and subsequent capitulations to the bureaucracy.
These failures created intra-party splits in the DPJ, weakening the
opposition’s unity. Furthermore, they fatally undermined voters’ confidence in
the DPJ’s ability to govern, worsening the problem of societal depoliticization
(which was already an issue due to the depoliticizing influence of media and
schools). In other words, the long-term ramifications of governmental
depoliticization serve to increase societal depoliticization in Japan. In turn,
increased societal depoliticization is preventing opposition parties from
regaining power and enacting the kinds of administrative reform that might
repoliticize the Japanese state. If the opposition hopes to break Japan’s
dominant party system once and for all, this “vicious cycle” of depoliticization
must somehow be redressed.

According to David Wallace-Wells, author of The Uninhabitable Earth,
“already, more than 10,000 people die each day from the small particles
emitted from fossil-fuel burning; each year, 339,000 people die from wildfire
smoke, in part because climate change has extended forest-fire season (in the
U.S., it has increased by seventy-eight days since 1970).”¹ Several states in the
international community have implemented policies to combat climate
change. The United States, however, has failed to put together a
comprehensive policy tackling the issues of climate change and reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. The purpose of this paper is to explore what the
United States has achieved with regards to climate policy, present the
limitations it has encountered that have precluded comprehensive policy
creation, and to explain why the future of climate change policy is highly
uncertain. While there have been significant gains, four key limitations — a
rise in conservative ideology, international noncooperation from the United
States, poor use of adversarial legalism, and poor timing — have been
sufficient in preventing the United States from creating comprehensive
climate change policy. This paper concludes with a look to the future in climate
policymaking, assessing whether or not a breakthrough will be feasible.

Is it possible in the united States?
ETHAN STERN-ELLIS

This article was written in the fall of 2020 and reflects the political realities
of that time, including the partisan majority in the Senate, the presidential
administration in power, and the signatory status of the United States to
the Paris Climate Accords. In an effort to honor the author’s analysis in its
most authentic form, the editors have decided to present the article
without any corrections to content that may conflict with or contradict the
political realities at the time of the issue’s publication.

IMPORTANT GAINS THAT SET THE STAGE

While the federal government has failed to develop a comprehensive
policy addressing the challenge of climate change, significant strides have
been made at the state and federal levels. This paper will mention four
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significant achievements that have been made in policy, legislative, and
administrative areas. First, the twenty-two legislative victories from 19641980 were the building blocks for current climate policymaking.² For example,
the Clean Air Act established national air quality standards to regulate motor
vehicle and stationary emission sources.³ The Clean Air Act also became a
central part of the 2007 opinion in Massachusetts vs. Environmental
Protection Agency, where it was held that, “...the Clean Air Act’s sweeping
definition of air pollutant unambiguously covers greenhouse gases…The act
requires EPA to regulate whenever it forms a judgment that an air pollutant
causes or contributes to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health and/or welfare”.⁴ As a result of this ruling, though
eventually regressed, the Bush administration issued an executive order
demanding the EPA to regulate greenhouse gasses.⁵ This ruling is just one
example of how the “golden era” legislative victories impact modern law.
A second achievement is how states have implemented successful
programs for regulating greenhouse gases. This is particularly true in
California, a state that passed the, “...first important public policy in the
United States to explicitly address the risks of climate change…” and made
other gains combating climate change in more elusive ways.⁶ As the first
important public policy to address the risks of climate change, what is known
as the Pavley Bill gave the California Air Resources Board (CARB) the power
to regulate greenhouse gasses.⁷ Given CARB’s extensive scientific and
technical expertise, this was a big win for environmentalists.⁸ California made
further progress when the state implemented a Renewable Portfolio Standard
(RPS) in 2002 to address the 2000-2001 Electricity Crisis.⁹ This RPS, which
became a model for other states, forced investor-owned utilities and retail
sellers to increase the renewable energy usage from 12% to 20% by 2017.¹⁰
This effort was a particularly savvy move by environmental organizations, who
managed not to bring up climate change when supporting the legislation and
argued successfully that this RPS would benefit the state financially.¹¹
California’s efforts “encouraged national environmental groups to pressure
the federal government for federal climate change legislation,” and while the
pressure proved unsuccessful, it is still a notable feat.¹²

A third achievement is the Obama administration’s incorporation of $80
billion into the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act to foster cleaner
energy, despite a partisan-blocked Congress.¹³ Lastly, a fourth achievement is
the introduction of the proposed Green New Deal, which calls on the federal
government to address the issue of global warming into public discourse.
While not presenting any specific policy solutions, the Green New Deal has
certainly created a framework and talking point for putting climate change in
the national spotlight during the 2020 Democratic Primaries, and may
provide some hope for future policy ventures.
KEY LIMITATIONS

While progress has been made in addressing climate change and
greenhouse gas emissions, there have been several limitations that have
prevented any sort of definitive and comprehensive policy from emerging.
Four limitations will be discussed in this paper. First, there is a complicated
story of conservative ideology and increasing polarization, which has emerged
and risen in the United States over the past several decades and altered the
national agenda that is set regarding climate change policy. There are three
critical aspects of this particular limitation. The first began with what is
referred to as the “Republican Reversal.” The “Republican Reversal” began
when the “...Reagan administration broke with bipartisan consensus on the
importance of environmental protection.”¹⁴ This shift occurred because
conservative ideology became a major identity in American politics, which led
to the rise of an organized network of conservative interests and ultimately
resulted in new attitudes toward the environment and climate change.¹⁵
The second aspect of this first limitation comes from the organized
network of conservative interests, namely the Koch brothers’ organization.
The Koch brothers began their network in 1977 by backing the creation of the
Cato Institute, coinciding with the period when the Republican Reversal was
taking hold.¹⁶ As of 2015, the Koch network has influenced at least fifteen
major organizations including think-tanks, policy advocates, donor
coordinators, constituency mobilizers, and political utilities.¹⁷ This influence
has resulted in “the Koch network...urging [Congressional] Republicans to
take positions against the beliefs of most of their constituents—including
majorities of moderate Republicans.”¹⁸ This congressional pressure has
contributed to limiting climate change action, in particular because the Koch
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brothers’ libertarian beliefs directly contradict any sort of centralized
government climate policy.
The third aspect contributing to the rise of conservative ideology is the
notion of the “Deep Story.” If, on one hand, there is the conservative ideology
championed by the Reagan administration and supported by organized
networks like the Koch network, then, on the other, there are the constituents
who are molded by these elements of society. Attention to the lived
experiences of constituents most affected by environmental misaction or lack
thereof reveals that constituents are “stuck” in a paradox: these constituents
live in Louisiana, one of the biggest victims of environmental problems in the
United States, yet they are increasingly hostile towards federal support.¹⁹
Why is this the case? The answer lies within the Deep Story: “[people] want to
achieve the American Dream, but for a mixture of reasons feel they are being
held back, and this leads people of the right to feel frustrated, angry, and
betrayed by the government.”²⁰ These same people, who already feel betrayed
by the federal government, believe that climate change is a hoax provoked by
“liberal fear” and align themselves with the Republican representation that
shares that sentiment.²¹ The deep story is part of why progressive states, like
California, can achieve much at the state level, but Republican or rightoriented states are beholden to their constituents’ and representatives’
interests and, in this case, disinterested in effecting comprehensive climate
policy change. The Deep Story, coupled with the first two aspects of this
limitation, is emblematic of a rise in conservative ideology that is at odds with
comprehensive climate change policy.
The second limitation is how the rise in conservative ideology has
impacted international agreements. According to Judith Layzer, “...the way
the problem of and solutions to climate are defined domestically is a primary
determinant of the U.S. position on international agreements to address it.”²²
In other words, U.S. decisions on international climate agreements are a
reflection of domestic interests. This is currently affecting the Paris Climate
Agreement (PCA), an international agreement into which President Obama
entered the United States in 2016. The goal of the agreement, which has
support from every state in the international community, is to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions enough so that there will be less than a two degree
celsius rise in global temperatures this century.²³ President Trump, champion
of those who have experienced the Deep Story, however, can remove the
United States from this agreement as of November 4th, 2020. Given Layzer’s
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The third limitation is that one of the main policymaking pathways used
to create climate policy is not conducive to comprehensive policy measures,
exemplified by the Rock Creek Mine case. Congress is a legislative body that
has been, “...a poster child for legislative gridlock.”²⁴ Because of this gridlock,
environmental groups have turned to what Christopher Klyza and David Sousa
dub as “alternative pathways” to conduct climate policy. One popular pathway,
which has been more of a limitation than a venue for successful
comprehensive climate policy, is what Robert Kagan calls “adversarial
legalism.” Adversarial legalism is a way in which groups and, for our purposes,
environmental groups, use litigation to combat opponents of their interests.²⁵
It is costly and time consuming. The Rock Creek Mine case shows just how this
process works. The Rock Creek Mine was first proposed in 1987 and the
struggle to approve construction of the mine continues to this day.²⁶ The
reason for this struggle is that environmental groups have found multiple ways
to invoke laws such as the Clean Air Act, Endangered Species Act, and Clean
Water Act to prevent the mine from being built, yet, at the same time, there is
a right to mine on public lands.²⁷ Both sides in this case use adversarial
legalism to attempt to achieve their goals. In a struggle that has lasted since
1987, neither side has won. This Rock Creek Mine case is a clear example of
how environmental groups in the United States spend considerable time
combating their opponents micro-issues to protect the environment, while
also making little progress in achieving comprehensive climate policy.
A fourth limitation is that the issue of climate change was born in the
wrong era. Anthony Downs explains a concept called the “issue attention
cycle.” According to Downs, there are five stages in this cycle. The first is the
pre-problem stage, where an undesirable social condition exists but has not
reached comprehensive policy combating climate change.²⁸ The second is the
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position on international agreements, it would seem contradictory for
President Trump to withdraw from the Paris agreement, especially since a
October 2019 Pew Research Center poll says that 67% of Americans say that
the federal government is not doing enough to reduce the effects of global
climate change (Funk and Kennedy). However, public opinion has little effect
on how climate is currently defined domestically. Instead, it is the members
identified in the discussion of the first limitation in this paper, President
Trump’s political base, that set the U.S. agenda on the international stage. This
explains why the current domestic environment has not been conducive to
comprehensive climate policy on an international level.
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stage of alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm, where the public
believes that it can be solved given enough effort.²⁹ This stage is important
because it is where the most policymaking can be achieved. The third stage is
the realization of the costs of significant progress, where part of the cost is
understood as a need to restructure the public’s way of living.³⁰ The fourth
stage is a gradual decline of intense public interest, leaving the final stage,
where any organizations or institutions created during the cycle are left to
battle these issues on their own.³¹ The problem with climate change and
reducing greenhouse gas emissions is that it was not the salient issue we know
today when environmental politics reached the second stage of the cycle in the
late twentieth century. Indeed, once environmental policy reached the fifth
stage of the cycle, the rise of conservative ideology began to take hold. One
might point out that, if the issue attention cycle is correct, then the issue of
climate change should have its own second stage where policy can be created.
However, it is because of the first and third limitations discussed in this paper
that the laws created during the late twentieth century are the only readily
available tools environmental groups can use to combat threats to the climate.
As shown throughout this paper, they are not quite the right tools for creating
a comprehensive policy combating climate change.
IS BREAKTHROUGH POSSIBLE?

There are some reasons to be optimistic for the future and some not to be,
but it is currently unpredictable. One reason to believe that it will be just as
difficult in the future is due to the legacy of judicial appointees put forth by the
Trump administration. One example of this legacy is that, “on the courts of
appeal, the final word in the overwhelming majority of federal cases, more
than one-quarter of active judges are Trump appointees.”³² These judges are
affiliated with the Federalist Society, a group of experienced lawyers that
President Trump appointed to make all of his judicial selections in order to
implement a web of conservative justices throughout the nation.³³ This will
already make it difficult to come up with a breakthrough, but if Trump is reelected and the Senate continues to enjoy a Republican majority, it will be even
more difficult in the future.
One reason to be optimistic is a possible revival of the Clean Power Plan.
The Clean Power Plan, introduced by the Obama administration, was an
attempt at a comprehensive policy solution to combat climate change. In
particular, it intended to, “reduce carbon pollution from power plants, the
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nation’s largest source, while maintaining energy reliability and
affordability.”³⁴ The Trump administration, however, revoked the CPP and
replaced it with the Affordable Clean Energy rule. This new rule is much
weaker compared to the CPP: it reduces power sector emissions between 0.71.5 percent by 2030, whereas the CPP would have reduced emissions by 32
percent by 2030.³⁵ Clearly, this is a huge blow to climate change combatants.
The reason there is hope, however, is that several environmental organizations
have organized to file suit against the EPA, in another attempt to invoke and
engage in adversarial legalism. In fact, an opening brief was filed on April 17th,
2020, arguing, “that EPA’s decision to repeal the Clean Power Plan was based
on a fundamental misreading of the Clean Air Act that would force EPA to
ignore common-sense, cost-effective emission reduction measures and would
‘frustrate the Act’s capacity to reduce the enormous amount of climate
pollution emitted by fossil fuel-fired power plants.’”³⁶ This is one case where
adversarial legalism would support comprehensive climate policy. It remains
to be seen, however, if this venture will be successful in bringing back the
Clean Power Plan.
The future of climate change policy and the feasibility of a policy
breakthrough are made unclear by recent developments related to the COVID19 pandemic, an ongoing event that has greatly impacted the United States
and the rest of the world. One mainstream argument against comprehensive
climate policy is that people simply will not change their habits in order to
battle climate change. The battle against COVID-19, however, has shown that
the United States can largely alter its habits for an extended period of time
rather quickly. The consequences of these changes on the environment are
starting to show and scientists are studying their potential global impacts.³⁷
Environmentalists are hopeful that the global community will see the results
of these consequences and gain a new understanding of how detrimental the
world’s current habits are to combating climate change. COVID-19 is also
throwing a curveball into the United States’ presidential and Senate elections.
What were already difficult and tight races are now unpredictable. The next
Senate and presidential administration will be crucial in determining whether
or not climate policy will become center stage on the national agenda.
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Nuclear Deterrence
and Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons
in Russia and the United States

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper was to show how, despite significant
achievements, four limitations have been sufficient in preventing the United
States from implementing comprehensive climate change policy. The
limitations have been a rise in conservative ideology, which is contributing to
empty international agreements, as well as poor use of adversarial legalism
and bad timing for the salience of climate issues. While a look to the future
shows uncertainty, what is certain is that, in a post-republican reversal era
where climate-reversal is sorely needed, the United States government is not
currently in a position to be the champion of climate change policy.
Comprehensive changes will be in the hands of future administrations,
congresses and everyday activists.

ANNEKE TAYLOR

In early 2020, the Pentagon confirmed the deployment of a new low-yield
nuclear weapon, the W76-2, to an unspecified number of Trident submarines
in the US.¹ The military already owns air-dropped bombs of a similar size, but
government officials argue that a submarine-launched weapon is strategically
important and is a necessary addition.² This is a major change in direction for
U.S. nuclear policy, as no significant new nuclear weapons have been added to
the arsenal in decades.³ These attempts to “modernize” the nuclear arsenal by
producing new weapons in the midst of increasingly problematic relations
with Russia have caused concern about a new arms race or even the possibility
of war. While military officials such as John Rood, former Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, argue that the new low-yield weapon “strengthens
deterrence and provides the United States with a prompt, more survivable
low-yield strategic weapon,” other military strategists, academics, and US
representatives argue that low yield weapons increase the likelihood of war by
lowering the threshold between conventional and nuclear warfare.⁴ I argue
that while low-yield weapons might, in certain circumstances, contribute to
nuclear deterrence, they introduce far too many destabilizing factors for any
additional level of deterrence to be worth the risk.
This article will explore the deterrence value of low-yield nuclear
weapons (LYNWs) and their role in increasing the likelihood of a war that
involves the use of both low-yield and standard yield nuclear weapons. The
recent tensions between the US and Russia over the inclusion of LYNWs in
Russian military strategy will serve as a case study. While it is uncertain
whether or not the Russian military truly has an “escalate to de-escalate'' war
plan involving LYNWs, as intelligence and government reports are
contradictory, the fact remains that US officials have based military actions
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and strategy on the existence of this plan and on the assumption that Russia
has LYNWs in its nuclear arsenal. This is perhaps an indication that the new
deployments are a result of an aggressive military culture rather than of
strategic thinking. The deployment of LYNWs also carries several risks, which
negate any deterrence value which comes from additional nuclear weapons.
Firstly, the apparent smaller impact and more practical scale of LYNWs both
lower the threshold between nuclear and conventional warfare. Secondly,
there is a possibility that warring states might not know which type of weapon
is being deployed, due to the frequent dual-use of launch systems for both high
and low yield weapons. Thirdly, according to war game simulations, a real war
involving the use of LYNWs, even if a yield limit was somehow maintained,
would likely still cause huge civilian casualties and destruction on a massive
scale. Lastly, it is possible that the use of the standard, non-nuclear deterrence
is sufficient. In this case, the deployment of any new nuclear weapons would
be a pointlessly risky move. All of these factors make extremely destructive
nuclear war more, not less, likely when states add low-yield warheads to their
arsenals.
The W76-2 warhead is estimated to have a yield of around six kilotons,
about a third of the explosive power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.⁵
Trident submarines are already equipped with similar warheads, the yields of
which are between 90 and 450 kilotons.⁶ While there is no official size
threshold that defines a weapon as low-yield, they are generally considered to
be weapons smaller than the nuclear bombs dropped in WWII.⁷ However, a
six-kiloton weapon is still five hundred times more powerful than the “most
powerful conventional explosive in the US arsenal.”⁸ LYNWs are often
referred to as “tactical” or “non-strategic” weapons, which are designed for use
on the battlefield during a military conflict, but they could also be used
strategically.⁹ With recent developments in targeting technology, the line
between strategic and tactical has become increasingly blurred.¹⁰ Large
nuclear weapons are usually considered to be strategic, as they can be used to
bomb large civilian populations, however low-yield weapons could also be
used on civilians as well. In general, the terms “tactical,” “non-strategic,” and
“low-yield” are used interchangeably, meaning there is no longer any real
distinction between them in terms of deterrence. All are assumed to have a
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yield lower than approximately 20 kilotons. For clarity, this article will use
only the term “low-yield,” but the sources cited may use either of the three
terms.
Arguments for and against the deployment of LYNWs center around
deterrence theory and mutually assured destruction. Deterrence, in its
simplest form, is the attempt to add as many costs as possible to an enemy
state’s cost/benefit analysis of whether the monetary, structural, and human
life costs of war are worth the gain in territory, resources, idealistic motives, or
any other factor a nation might hold as beneficial. Nuclear deterrence rests on
the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD), which assumes that a war
between any nuclear-armed states will result in a quick and devastating
destruction of both countries (as well as their neighbors and allies), due to the
massive impact of nuclear weapons (including radioactive fallout and other
radiation effects) and the relative ease of using them.¹¹ Theoretically, nucleararmed states are therefore faced with two possible outcomes: peace, if
weapons are not used, or complete destruction of all parties involved if
weapons are used. However, LYNWs complicate the special status of nuclear
weapons as potentially extinction event-inducing devices and may undermine
nuclear deterrence by appearing to reduce the threat of total mutual
destruction.
Government proponents of adding LYNWs to the U.S. nuclear arsenal
argue that the weapons fill an essential gap in an attempt to match that of
Russia’s and without them the US remains vulnerable.¹² This argument is
based on Russia’s reported but not confirmed “escalate to de-escalate” plan,
which holds that, should a European war erupt and endanger Russian
territory, Russia would launch low-yield weapons at tactical targets in Europe,
forcing their opponents to surrender.¹³ The alternative to European surrender
to Russian forces is theorized to be a counter deployment and detonation of a
U.S. low-yield weapon.¹⁴ Low-yield weapon advocates argue that having this
option available would extend deterrence from large scale conflict to smaller
scale conflict, as well as preclude Russia from attempting this “escalate to deescalate” tactic.¹⁵ Some defense experts, like Elbridge Colby, argue that a
smaller scale nuclear war would be preferable to a large scale war, and that we
should pursue proliferation to increase deterrence.¹⁶ These arguments
downplay the importance of two key dangers: the potential escalation from
small-scale, low-yield nuclear warfare to larger-scale, standard or high-yield
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nuclear warfare and the enormous death toll that would likely result from even
a limited nuclear warfare.
Key arguments against the deployment of LYNWs focus on the possibility
of escalation to the use of high-yield nuclear weapons once the nuclear
threshold has been lowered. Many argue that having a less destructive nuclear
option makes the choice to shift to nuclear weapons easier, because the lowyield weapons can be used tactically or in smaller strategic areas. Additionally,
LYNWs may not appear as likely to lead to an outcome of mutual destruction.
These weapons are more “survivable,” meaning that the effects and
externalities of LYNW deployment and detonation are perceived to be less
severe than those assumed of a traditional, twenty kiloton to megaton size,
nuclear bomb.¹⁷ The use of LYNWs could potentially lead to higher-yield
nuclear war, as the nuclear threshold would have already been lowered with
the use of lower-yield weapons.
General Andre Beaufre, a “renowned military thinker and strategist,”
writes that when low-yield weapons are introduced and the nuclear threshold
is lowered, “the risk of an accidental or inadvertent nuclear war increases.”¹⁸
Although Beaufre argues for the deterrence value of LYNWs, Beaufre still
acknowledges the danger of LYNW use potentially lowering the nuclear
threshold. Once a nation detects that a nuclear weapon has been launched at
them, they probably do not have time to assess the yield of the weapon and
resulting damage, and as a result, will retaliate using whatever nuclear
weapons they have in their arsenal. This makes communication between
warring states impossible in the short run because the country being attacked
does not know what is happening. If a submarine were to launch a warhead,
the enemy would be unable to differentiate between a small weapon,
supposedly meant to prevent escalation, and a large weapon. The enemy
would then be forced to choose between retaliating at full strength or possibly
under-reacting to a serious threat, giving up their crucial window for a second
strike.¹⁹ This has been an issue with other low-yield nuclear weapons,
including Pakistan’s launching systems that work for both conventional and
nuclear weapons, and the existing US warheads with adjustable yields.²⁰ This
difficulty of differentiation is a significant issue when considering the
deterrent effects of low-yield weapons, as, in certain cases, it negates any
additional deterrence a low-yield weapon would produce since there is no way
to tell which weapon is being used. This potential for escalation from a
relatively contained nuclear conflict to a full nuclear war makes low-yield
17

Burns

19

Facini

18

Hussain, Jamal. 2014. "Impact of the Induction of Tactical
Nuclear Weapons by Pakistan on overall Deterrence."
Defence Journal 17 (7) (02): 22-25.

20

Hooey, Daniel. "Pakistan's Low Yield in the Field:
Diligent Deterrence or De-Escalation Debacle." Joint
Force Quarterly: JFQ no. 95 (Fourth, 2019): 40.

https://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/thecommons/vol1/iss2/5
47

ESSAYS

weapons, at least as they are currently deployed, dangerously unpredictable.
Additionally, any “special” deterrence value ascribed to LYNWs is nulled by
the fact that, in reality, warring states do not set kiloton yield limits before
engaging in battle and in most cases would not have time to assess damage
before retaliating. As Michael Krepon argues: “if two states have screwed up so
badly that they have used nuclear weapons on a battlefield, how are they
supposed to agree on the number of detonations and yields?”²¹
While proponents of low-yield nuclear weapons argue that these
weapons strengthen deterrence, proponents also maintain that a war
involving their use could remain small in scale and not necessarily progress to
an all-out nuclear war.²² This assumption is key to such an argument, but can
easily be dissolved, as was discussed previously. While I would argue that
nuclear war of any scope should be avoided, some see a limited nuclear war as
a reasonable possibility. Experts like Elbridge Colby argue that a nuclear war
conducted using only low-yield weapons would be an acceptable risk to take
for the supposed increase in deterrence.²³ If the argument that LYNWs
increase deterrence is sound, why is Colby’s argument necessary? The limited
actual usefulness of low yield warheads off of the battlefield and the
probability of extensive civilian casualties are too significant to ignore in
discussions of the supposed deterrent properties of low-yield weapons.²⁴
Firstly, low-yield weapons may not be practical for battlefield use, as their
sheer size and possible unpredictability could possibly endanger weapondeploying combatants and could interfere with attempts to advance into
irradiated territory.²⁵ This could drive the deployment and detonation away
from the main arena of combat to an alternative site, possibly one near
civilians, where “ease” of use is more assured. Aside from causing civilian
casualties by way of civilian-targeted retaliation, expanding beyond military
targets could encourage the use of more, possibly higher-yield weapons and
escalate the conflict to a traditional nuclear war.
Secondly, “low-yield” weapons are still incredibly deadly. According to
expert Daniel Hooey, “initial wargames and exercises in the 1950s [with lowyield nuclear weapons] revealed that ‘in only 9 days of simulated nuclear
combat, West Germany was judged to have suffered three times the civilian
casualties of [World War II].’... LYNWs introduce additional factors that must
be carefully considered, such as increased potential for miscalculation, nuclear
accidents, and unauthorized use.”²⁶ The outcomes of this simulation
demonstrate how destructive even an exclusively low-yield war could be.
When the difficulty of limiting weapons in a nuclear war to a smaller yield is
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considered, the scale of this supposedly preferable war begins to look very
similar to the scale that would assure mutual destruction.
The recent U.S. deployment of new LYNWs as a response to the Russian
“escalate to de-escalate” plan discussed previously brings up another issue
behind arguments advocating for LYNWs: these weapons and their
deployment may not be truly motivated by strategy at all. Supporters of the
anti-low-yield position, including Michael Krepon, argue that the Russian
“escalate to de-escalate” plan that is considered the most compelling
justification for LYNW deployment is essentially non-existent. They argue that
the deployment of LYNWs is due to the U.S. military’s desire to build up the
nuclear arsenal based on groundless rumor.²⁷ In her 2016 analysis of Russian
nuclear doctrine, Olga Oliker argues that there is no evidence that the “escalate
to de-escalate” tactic is part of any legitimate Russian war plan.²⁸ As the tactic
involves shifting from conventional to nuclear weaponry, this tactic would
require Russia to lower their nuclear threshold, and increase their willingness
to shift from conventional to nuclear weapons, which would be a bold and
dangerous choice.²⁹ She argues that if the US were to incorporate low-yield
weapons into their arsenal and lower their nuclear threshold to match Russian
actions, particularly if accompanied by the development of more “usable”
nuclear weapons,³⁰ both states would significantly increase the risk of nuclear
war.³¹ Oliker adds that, even if Russia is considering the deployment of
LYNWs as a part of their “escalate to de-escalate” plan, Russia might see
increased American investment in LYNWs as an indication of the weakness of
the U.S. conventional war machine, further encouraging aggressive action
from Russia.³²
In addition, while the US government would perhaps argue that
deploying their own low-yield warheads would be intended purely for defense
and deterrence, increased investment in and improvement of U.S. offensive
capabilities could be interpreted by Russia as a response to their own earlier
development and deployment of low-yield nuclear weaponry. This is a classic
example of the security dilemma³³ and means that the deployment of new US
low-yield weapons would probably only increase tensions between the US and
Russia. The fact that the U.S. government’s primary justification for the recent
27

Michael Krepon,“Escalating to De-Escalate.” Arms Control
Wonk. Accessed May 15, 2020. https://
www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1204755/escalatingto-de-escalate/.

28

Olga Oliker, “Russia's Nuclear Doctrine.” Center for Strategic
and International Studies, April 23, 2019: 11.

29

Oliker, 11.

30

Ibid., 10

Published by Sound Ideas, 2021
49

31

Ibid., 11.

32

Ibid., 12.

33

The security dilemma holds that actions taken by a
state intended to increase its own security, such as
military build-up or weapons deployment, will likely
be taken by other states as a threat to their own
security. The other state(s) will then build up their
own military, and the first will build up more, and so
on, leading to a tense situation in which both states
are less secure and at a higher risk of war than
when they started.

ESSAYS

and continued development of low-yield weapons is a hypothetical,
unconfirmed Russian war plan demonstrates that arguments for adding more
LYNWs to the arsenal may be more motivated by a nuclear-focused and
aggressive military culture than by actual benefits to nuclear deterrence.
Lastly, this discussion of nuclear deterrence in the context of LYNWs
begets a larger question about the actual efficacy of nuclear deterrence as a
means of dissuading conflict: is deterrence as a whole — that is, the total cost/
benefit analysis of all aspects of warfare — as opposed to nuclear deterrence
the operative mechanism in obstructing potential world war? Perhaps the U.S.
and Russia never felt that a full-on war, be it nuclear or conventional, would
be worth the costs, given what little gain would come from war based on
idealistic differences with no extant threat to either homeland.³⁴ Perhaps
ordinary deterrence, not mutually assured destruction, was what prevented
the Cold War from ever becoming hot; without the long range, immensely
destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons, war perhaps never would have
happened.³⁵ If this is the case, then there is no need for any further nuclear
proliferation, which has the potential to escalate quickly, and even
accidentally, from the use of low-yield weapons, because then deterrence
would not be based on nuclear capabilities at all.³⁶ Even if MAD has indeed
been the only means of preventing war, filling the small theoretical gap in
deterrence with low-yield weapons is not worth the risk of a lowered threshold
to nuclear escalation. Since we can never know exactly the reason why large
scale nuclear war has never become a reality, it is never advisable to introduce
new nuclear weapons into an already massively destructive stockpile.
Rather than contributing to deterrence, LYNWs weaken deterrence by
making nuclear weapons appear as a more realistic option for use on the
battlefield. LYNWs do not carry the stigma of traditional nuclear weapons, and
therefore may be considered for practical use in military plans, weakening the
all-or-nothing deterrence of MAD and encouraging nuclear war. Additionally,
since MAD or nuclear deterrence may not be the main factor in preventing war
in all cases, stockpiling additional LYNWs would only increase international
tensions. Warring states would not be able to assess damage or yield before
retaliating without missing a crucial second-strike window and would be
compelled to escalate conflict. In addition, most LYNWs are housed in multipurpose launch systems, meaning that a targeted nation would have no way of
knowing what kind of weapon had been launched. In the case of recent events,
many arguments for the deployment of LYNWs center around the Russian
“escalate to de-escalate” tactic and hold that additional U.S. LYNWs are
necessary to maintain a deterrent balance between the US’s and Russia’s
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nuclear capabilities. However, the legitimacy of the pro-LYNWs argument is
undercut by the possible fictitiousness of the Russian war plan itself. The fact
that real US deployments have been justified by questionable intelligence from
Russia indicates that perhaps these deployments are not strategic, but rather
a product of a nuclear-focused defense apparatus and an administration
inclined towards intimidation through stockpiling. The lowering of the
threshold for nuclear war that the adoption of low-yield nuclear weapons
would likely assure demonstrates that LYNWs do not contribute to the
protection of peace through nuclear deterrence and that further deployment
would be dangerous and unnecessary.
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